Abstract: Social choice is studied by employing a group invariance approach in a way that appears not to have been previously been exploited. This simplifies the problem and the proofs and provides some new insights into the foundations of impossibility results.
INTRODUCTION
Social choice theory is concerned with the problem of aggregating individuals' reports of their preferences over alternative states of the world into a ranking of these states. This raises some very simple questions. Under what conditions is such a ranking possible? What are its characteristics when it exists? Despite their simplicity, these questions present some difficulty and are now addressed from various angles by an enormous literature, much of which has been thoroughly surveyed in the Handbook of Mathematical Economics and the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare.
1 Even given this body of work, there continue to be gains in understanding from employing new techniques to simplify the problem and give fresh perspectives. Some attempt is made to do this here by using a kind of group invariance that, to the best of our knowledge, has not previously been used.
The main feature of the framework we use to interpret the problem is to treat the mechanism that aggregates reports as a continuous mapping from the space of preferences, thought of as a subset of IR n , to Interpreting preferences as points in IR n is a fairly natural idea and has already been widely used in choice theory. Sen A, 1974 (Sen A, 1986 pp. 1111 , for example, treat reports as utilities and allow for the fact that these are not uniquely specified by defining the family of functions that carry equivalent information. 2 Roemer also presents choice problems in this framework (Roemer J, 1996) . This idea is developed in this paper by focusing directly on the mathematical structure of the problem in a way that might facilitate further analysis and by exploiting the properties of continuously differentiable functions.
3 For example there is an equivalent in (Roemer J, 1996) to the theorem presented in the last section of our paper. In our paper, however, this theorem is simply an immediate corollary of developments in a different analytical framework.
We set out the paper as follows. In the next section the interpretation of the choice problem is explained. In the following sections we prove the main theorem and its corollaries for welfare functions under different conditions.
THE SOCIAL ORDERING PROBLEM

The Problem
The possible states of the world are given by a topological space V and these are to be ranked by a welfare function, , that assigns an ordering based on information on the preferences of some finite number off individuals, n , over every element in V . Information 
It simplifies matters to concentrate on the space X rather than the functions in and to deal with equivalent information by constructing a family of transformations that can be used to map x to all y for all x ,y . It is assumed that a permissible transformation operates on each individual's reports independently of its operation on the reports of other individuals. This means a transformation f will be required to operate componentwise on each element of
It follows from the nature of the problem that permissible transformations should form a group: (i) if f and g are transformations then fg is a transformation; (ii) the transformation f (x) = ex where e is the identity is always allowed; (iii) if f is permissible so is g where fg = gf = e the identity element.
In the present paper we restrict attention to some cases of actions by groups that are continuous and 4 We simply shortcut the literature on the relation between the BergsonSamuelson welfare function and choice functionals. See (Roemer J, 1996, p. 29) for references.
5
The information content of reports is discussed in detail by Sen with reference to the literature on utility functions (Sen A, 1986 ).
path-connected. As noted by a referee, compared to the standard arrovian or senian analysis, this is a stringent condition to impose on the social welfare function. However we make some rather precise statements within this limited scope.
These conditions are summarized in the following axiom:
[A1]: A transformation is permissible under information condition if it is an element of the continuous path-connected group G where
f (x) where x and f (x) convey the same information under condition }
Since the content of all permissible transformations under the given information conditions is the same, a necessary condition for a welfare function to be acceptable is:
is acceptable under information condition if and only if
Additional Conditions on the Welfare Function
A welfare function is also required to satisfy the following conditions:
is continuous and everywhere differentiable.
[A4] is not constant anywhere or dictatorial.
A welfare function is dictatorial if there exists an agent i and some acceptable monotonic function
: IR IR such that for all x X we have (x) = (x i ) . It is obvious that any constant or dictatorial function always trivially satisfies equation (order).
Equality Conditions on the Welfare Function
The inequality conditions in equation (1) can be replaced by equality conditions as follows Theorem 1. Suppose satisfies Conditions
Proof of Theorem 1. For the if part suppose (x) = (y) (f (x)) = (f (y)) and assume (f (x)) = (f (y)) for all f G . This contradicts the assumption (x) > (y) . Only if is immediate.
Continuous Parameter Transformations
Of particular interest is the case where the elements of the group can be identified with continuously varying parameters a = (a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n ) . Indeed we are most interested in situations where G is a smooth manifold in the sense of the following definition. In what follows we place the emphasis on the mathematical structure of choice under the group operations and only make brief reference to the information conditions they imply. This loses a little in connection with the literature but gives gains in terms of clarity. 6 For generality we let all group transformations operate on a p dimensional subspace of X where 1 < p n . We start with the translations.
TRANSLATIONS
Suppose the information condition allows reports of individuals to be translated by adding a constant, not necessarily the same for each individual. In this case the difference x i (v) x i ( v ) is retained and there is enough information to make interpersonal comparisons between reports on states of the world (d' Aspermont and Gevers 2002, p. 60, Roemer, J. 1996, p.18) . This transformation will be trivial if the constant is the group identity e = (0, 0,…, 0 
for some monotonic : IR IR and some
: W IR and some constant C G t .
Proof of Theorem 2:
See Appendix 1.
MULTIPLICATIONS
Consider the information condition that allows reports to be multiplied by a constant, not necessarily the same for each individual. In this case information on ratios is retained (Tsui and Weymark, 1997) . The multiplication group G m IR + n acts non-trivially on the first p coordinates of X IR + n and trivially on the remainder with action
for y X .
Corollary 1 of Theorem 2:
7 will be G m -acceptable if and only if it has the form:
This might be compared with Tsui and Weymarks result that under multiplications, or ratio scale transformations, the only acceptable welfare function is Cobb-Douglas (Tsui and Weymark, 1997).
where w = (y p+1 ,…,y n ) W for some : IR IR and some : W IR and some C G m . 
Proof
EXPONENTS
An interesting question is whether there is an acceptable welfare function for non-linear transformations. Consider the condition that allows reports to be raised to a positive power, not necessarily the same for each individual. In this case information on ratios is retained after the change of coordinates x i ln z i . This transformation is given by a continuous group G p IR + n that acts on the first p coordinates of
T . This action is defined by 
IMPOSSIBILITY
Consider any group of permissible transformations G c with the property that its action contains two or more non-trivial actions from the set of transformations {G t ,G m ,G p } . This gives:
Corollary 3 of Theorem 2:
There is no G cacceptable .
Proof: This follows immediately from the fact that a G c -acceptable would require at least two of the conditions set out on Theorem add, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 to be satisfied simultaneously.
In this case we have an analogue to an Arrow type impossibility theorem. It will be noted that it is not necessary to allow any order preserving transformation to be permissible to get an impossibility result. From Corollary 1 and 2 we obtain the stronger result that impossibility holds under the weaker condition that permissible transformations are restricted to the affine transformation group.
The part of this result that deals with the affine transformation given by combining and G m is familiar from the literature and has been discussed at length in a different context by, for example, (dAspremont and Gevers, 2002 , Roemer J, 1996 and Sen A, 1974 . It is well known from this literature that, unlike the translation and the multiplication the affine transformation does not permit interpersonal comparison (dAspremont and Gevers, 2002, p. 60 ). This could be extended to note that raising reports to a positive power also permits some interpersonal comparison. Combinations involving G p do not permit such comparison.
CONCLUSION
This paper has treated choice as a mapping IR n to IR and has developed the idea using continuity and a group invariance condition to identify the welfare functions that are acceptable under different information conditions. It should be stressed that there are no other acceptable functions under each information condition than those identified.
Among the questions that remain is what happens when preferences are interdependent as a result of an individual having a concern for the welfare of others, or being influenced by fashion or expectations. In this case the report of individual i would be a function of is preferences and the reports of some other set of individuals, say j and k . It would be possible to deal with this by examining transformation groups that do not act on each preference individually. Despite its difficulty, this might develop some interesting insights on choice under different forms of interdependency (beyond the scope of the present paper).
The authors gratefully acknowledge the referee's careful reading and many constructive comments which have clarified the present paper and helped to set the results in context. As noted previously, any x X has the form (x) = w ( C w ,h ) = ( C w ,h + (w)).
APPENDIX
So by equation (accept), for any a G t , (a, (x)) = (a + x) = ( C w ,a + C w ,h + (w)) = ( C w ,a + 1 ( (x)))
namely (a,t) = ( C w ,a + 1 (t)) where t = (x) and the left hand side is independent of w for any given t . Since is monotonic, C w ,a is independent of of w . This means that C w is a constant C G t , as required.
